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Notes and Comments
Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo
Revisited: Old Lessons for New Problems
I. Introduction
The importance of protecting the rights which attach to the
ownership of land has been recognized since the inception of this
country. The framers of the United States Constitution pro-
tected these interests through the Fifth Amendment.1 Today, as
the debate over land use and the government's proper role in
land use decisions continues,2 it may be time to re-examine the
history of state and local governmental control over land use de-
cisions in New York, and learn some new lessons from old
teachings.
The drawback of allowing land use decisions to be made
solely at the local level is most clearly stated as follows:
Local officials have a difficult time defining, let alone implement-
ing, "the public interest."..... [T]he public interest of each com-
munity is most often the self-interest of the residents who got
there first. Thus, suburban communities may see their economic
and social interest served through exclusionary zoning that at-
tracts high taxpaying clean industry while excluding low-income
service-consuming residents.3
1. The Fifth Amendment provides that: "No person shall . . . be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. See, e.g., Terry Rice, Zoning and Land Use, 40 SYRACUSE L. REV. 641 (1989);
Edward J. Sullivan, The State of the Comprehensive Land-Use Plan in 1987: So Close,
Yet So Far Away, 20 THE URB. LAW. 971 (1988); ROBERT D. YARO & CHRISINE REID,
STATE AND REGIONAL GROWTH MANAGEMENT INITIATIVES: LESSONS FOR MASSACHUSETTS
(January 1988).
3. Arthur P. Solomon, Five Land-Reforms, 1977 J. HOUSING 276, 277.
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However, a balance must be struck between the local interest in
maintaining authority over land use decisions and the state in-
terest in regulating these decisions to minimize the impact on
the region or the state.
In a 1972 decision, the New York Court of Appeals ad-
dressed the proper scope of local governmental authority over
the development of its land. In Golden v. Planning Bd. of
Ramapo," the court upheld the municipality's right to regulate
development. The municipality could effectively prevent subdi-
vision on a given plat 5 for as long as eighteen years through spe-
cial permits for subdivision approval.6 Ramapo's effort to control
the growth of its town is not unique.7 Through a variety of tech-
niques," many towns attempt to maintain their character or sta-
tus quo9 and to avoid the problems related to increased develop-
ment and urbanization. 10
This Comment will examine whether the ability to regulate
land use decisions" is properly vested in local government, or
whether it should be shifted to regional - or even
state - government to consider broader issues and impacts not
currently examined by municipalities. Part II of this Comment
Will examine Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo2 and the
court's reasoning in upholding the local measure. Part II will
also examine the current trends in New York Court of Appeals'
decisions to illustrate the dichotomy among these decisions. Fur-
4. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409. U.S.
1003 (1972). See infra notes 14-48 and accompanying text.
5. A "plat" is an individal plot of land subdivided into smaller lots or parcels.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1036 (5th ed. 1979).
6. Golden, 30 N.Y.2d at 367, 285 N.E.2d at 294-95, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 142-43.
7. Other regulation techniques include zoning, bulk and density restrictions, vari-
ances, subdivision control and site plan review. ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET. AL., THE LAW
OF PROPERTY §§ 9.3, 9.5, 9.7 & 9.15 (1984).
8. See, e.g., Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378
N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975) (exclusionary zoning); Golden, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334
N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972) (timed growth ordinance).
9. See, e.g., Berenson, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 110, 341 N.E.2d 236, 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672,
681 (1975).
10. Golden, 30 N.Y.2d at 366, 285 N.E.2d at 294, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 142.
11. See, e.g., N.Y. TOWN LAW §§ 261-77 (McKinney 1987); N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE
LAW § 10 (McKinney 1969 & Supp. 1990).
12. Golden, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed,
409 U.S. 1003 (1972). See infra notes 14-48 and accompanying text.
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ther, this section will explore the issues involved in delegating
power to local governments to regulate land uses, including a
brief discussion of the home rule tradition in New York. 3 Part
II will also examine some representative state-wide land use
schemes. Part III will analyze these state regulations of local
land use decisions and determine what lessons New York can
learn from the experiences of other states. Part IV will conclude
that the time has come for land use reform in New York.
II. Background
A. The Early Cases
In the early 1970s, the town of Ramapo was faced with in-
creasing development."' To inhibit development and prevent the
problems that accompany urbanization, 15 the town adopted a
master plan,' 6 a comprehensive zoning ordinance and a capital
budget.' In addition, the town enacted zoning amendments
designed to synchronize private land development with the de-
velopment of essential governmental services.' 8 These subject
amendments created a new class of land use, the "Residential
Development Use,"' 9 which required a special permit.20 Any per-
son engaged in residential development was required to obtain
13. See generally N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10 (McKinney 1969 & Supp. 1990).
14. The court cited statistics on the growth and development of Ramapo. From
1940-1968, population in the unincorporated areas of the town increased by approxi-
mately 286%. This percentage was broken down, with a 130.8% increase in the period
between 1950 and 1960, a 78.5% increase in the period between 1960 and 1966 and a
20.4% increase between 1966 and 1969. Actual population numbers increased from
58,626 people in 1966 to a projected 120,000 in 1985 (according to then current land use
and zoning trends). Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 366 n.1, 285
N.E.2d 291, 294 n.1, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 142 n.1, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
15. Id. at 366, 285 N.E.2d at 294, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 142.
16. A master plan is "the omnibus plan of a [municipality] for housing, industry and
recreational facilities and their impacts. ... BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 880 (5th ed.
1979).
17. Golden, 30 N.Y.2d at 366, 285 N.E.2d at 294, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 142.
18. Id. at 367, 285 N.E.2d at 295, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 143. These services were limited
to five essentials: public sanitary sewers, drainage facilities, improved public parks or
recreation facilities including public schools, roads (either public or private) and fire-
houses. Id. at 368, 285 N.E.2d at 295, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 143-44.
19. Residential Development Use was defined "as the erection or construction of
dwellings on any vacant plot or parcel." Id.
20. Id. at 368, 285 N.E.2d at 295, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 143.
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such a permit from the town.2"
Each plat of land was assigned points based on the availa-
bility of municipal services and improvements," with the special
permit issuing only after the accumulation of fifteen develop-
ment points.2" While accumulation of points for an unimproved
parcel could take a number of years,24 the town attempted to
mitigate unreasonable burdens on developers through a variety
of remedial provisions. 25 One provision gave developers a reduc-
tion in their tax assessments. Another provision allowed the
board to issue special permits vesting in the developers a present
right to develop subject only to point accumulations, 26 or in spe-
cial circumstances allowing development absent full point accu-
mulations.27 In addition, the developer was free to provide the
improvements or services himself and, thus, advance the date of
approval. 28 A developer challenged Ramapo's ordinance, claim-
ing that it operated to destroy the value of, and constituted an
invasion of, the property rights of landowners.29
The court first examined the state legislature's delegation of
regulatory power to the local governments. 30 Because local gov-
ernments do not have any independent power to regulate, they
21. Id.
22. Golden, at 368, 285 N.E.2d at 295, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 143-44.
23. Id.
24. Ramapo's capital program provided a six year capital budget for improvements
specified in the master plan. In addition, a supplement was adopted for the timing and
sequence of municipal improvements for twelve years following the life of the capital
budget. Id. at 366-67, 285 N.E.2d at 294-95, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 142-43. Therefore, an
owner/developer of an unimproved plat could wait as long as eighteen years for the req-
uisite improvements and fifteen accumulated development points. Id. at 367, 285 N.E.2d
at 295, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 143.
25. Id. at 369, 285 N.E.2d at 296, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
26. Golden, at 368, 285 N.E.2d at 296, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 144. By vesting in the devel-
oper a present right to proceed with the development (even though actual development
cannot begin until all fifteen points have been accumulated), the developer had a right
that was fully assignable. Id. Based on this plan, a plat with a present right to develop
could be rendered more valuable than another plat without a present right to develop.
27. Id. at 369, 285 N.E.2d at 296, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 144. The special circumstances
existed where the planning board determined that, by granting a permit, the develop-
ment was still consistent with the on-going plan. Id.
28. Id. at 368-69, 285 N.E.2d at 296, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
29. Id. at 365-66, 285 N.E.2d at 294, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 142. For a discussion of the
constitutional property issues attendant to this claim, see infra notes 122-32 and accom-
panying text.
30. Golden, 30 N.Y.2d at 369-70, 285 N.E.2d at 296, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 145.
[Vol. 12:107
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol12/iss1/3
GOLDEN REVISITED
must look to state enabling legislation."1 The appropriate ena-
bling enactments are found in New York's Town Law.3 2 While
this delegation of power to local governments is couched in
terms of police power, s3 the authority is not broad and general,
but is necessarily limited to problems attendant to a land use
scheme. 4 The court found that the town was legislating to avoid
31. Id. at 370, 285 N.E.2d at 296, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 145.
32. See generally N.Y. TOWN LAW §§ 261-84 (McKinney 1987) (zoning and planning
powers given to towns).
33. See, e.g., N.Y. TOWN LAW § 261 (McKinney 1987) which provides, in part, that a
town can regulate certain land uses "[flor the purpose of promoting the health, safety,
morals, or the general welfare of the community .... " Id.
34. Golden, 30 N.Y.2d at 371 n.5, 285 N.E.2d at 297 n.5, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 146 n.5.
Town Law § 263 lists the purposes for which a town can regulate, thus qualifying or
limiting the general police power. Section 263 provides:
Such regulations shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan and
designed to lessen congestion in the streets, to secure safety from fire, flood, panic
and other dangers; to promote health and general welfare; to provide adequate
light and air; to prevent the overcrowding of land; to avoid undue concentration of
population; to make provision for, so far as conditions may permit, the accommo-
dation of solar energy systems and equipment and access to sunlight necessary
therefor; to facilitate the adequate provision of transportation, water, sewerage,
schools, parks and other public requirements. Such regulations shall be made with
reasonable consideration, among other things, as to the character of the district
and its peculiar suitablity for particular uses, and with a view to conserving the
value of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout
such municipality.
N.Y. TOWN LAW § 263 (McKinney 1987).
In addition, Town Law section 261 lists the permissible areas of regulation, thus
further restricting the general police power of the municipality. Section 261 provides:
For the purpose of promoting the health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of
the community, the town board is hereby empowered by ordinance to regulate and
restrict the height, number of stories and size of buildings and other structures,
the percentage of lot that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts, and other
open spaces, the density of population, and the location and use of buildings,
structures and land for trade, industry, residence or other purposes; provided that
such regulations shall apply to and affect only such part of a town as is outside the
limits of any incorporated village or city; provided further, that all charges and
expenses incurred under this article for zoning and planning shall be a charge
upon the taxable property of that part of the town outside of any incorporated
village or city. The town board is hereby authorized and empowered to make such
appropriations as it may see fit for such charges and expenses, provided however,
that such appropriation shall be the estimated charges and expenses less fees, if
any, collected, and provided, that the amount so appropriated shall be assessed,
levied and collected from the property outside of any incorporated village or city.
Such regulations may provide that a board of appeals may determine and vary
their application in harmony with their general purpose and intent, and in accor-
dance with general or specific rules therein contained.
1992]
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undue concentration of population by limiting development to
parallel the government's ability to support it with essential ser-
vices. 3 5 By restricting development, the town was able to main-
tain existing population densities, 36 as permitted by state law.37
Thus, the court found that because Ramapo's regulations fell
within the parameters of the Town Law provisions, the measures
were exercised for a legitimate purpose. 8
The court engaged in a lengthy discussion of the power of a
municipality to regulate its land development. While acknowl-
edging the validity of local regulation, 39 the court noted that
"current zoning enabling legislation is burdened by the largely
antiquated notion which deigns that the regulation of land use
and development is uniquely a function of local government...
"40 The court here was indicating an impatience with the then
current law in New York, and further indicated that it was time
for the law to change:41 "Recognition of communal and regional
interdependence, in turn, has resulted in proposals for schemes
of regional and State-wide planning, in the hope that decisions
would then correspond roughly to their level of impact." '42 The
court was concerned that, because decisions are made purely at
the local level, regional or even state-wide impact may be
ignored.
After expressing concerns over the delegation of power to
local governments, the court went further and, as though ad-
dressing the legislature directly, said:
Of course, [undirected growth] problems cannot be solved by
Ramapo or any single municipality, but depend upon the accom-
modation of widely disparate interests for their ultimate resolu-
tion. To that end, State-wide or regional control of planning
would insure that interests broader than that of the municipality
underlie various land use policies.4 3
N.Y. TOWN LAW § 261 (McKinney 1987).
35. Golden, 30 N.Y.2d at 370 n.3, 285 N.E.2d at 296-97 n.3, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 145 n.3.
36. Id.
37. N.Y. ToWN LAW § 263 (McKinney 1987).
38. Golden, 30 N.Y.2d at 371, 285 N.E.2d at 297, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 146.
39. Id. at 383, 285 N.E.2d at 304-05, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 156.
40. Id. at 374, 285 N.E.2d at 299, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 148.
41. Id. at 375-76, 285 N.E.2d at 300, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 149-50.
42. Id. at 375, 285 N.E.2d at 300, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 149.
43. Golden, 30 N.Y.2d at 376, 285 N.E.2d at 300, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 150. The court
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Thus the court, addressing its concerns over the state's complete
delegation of power to the local government, through the above
language, expressed its belief that the law should be changed.
Even the dissent, although finding Ramapo's measures be-
yond the scope of state enabling legislation,"" still noted the im-
portance of state-wide regulation:' 5 "Generally, there is the view
that the conflict [between urban sprawl and local efforts to ex-
clude urban population] requires solution at a regional or State
level, usually with local administration, and not by compounding
the conflict with idiosyncratic municipal action."'" Thus, the dis-
sent and the majority, while disagreeing on the validity of
Ramapo's measures under enabling legislation,"7 both agreed
that the ability to regulate was more appropriate at a regional or
even state level and, therefore, the law should be changed.'"
In another important land use and zoning decision, Beren-
son v. Town of New Castle,'9 the court created a standard for
determining whether a zoning ordinance was exclusionary." To
meet state constitutional requirements, the court required that a
municipality's zoning ordinance provide for a balanced and well-
ordered community and consider regional as well as town
needs.5 Whether a zoning ordinance has considered regional
needs would be determined by the court, which must "take into
consideration not only the general welfare of the residents of the
had previously noted that there was currently (1972) a proposal in the state legislature to
.create an integrated state-wide planning process, with emphasis on regional and state
planning powers. Id. at 371-72 n.6, 285 N.E.2d at 297-98 n.6, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 146 n.6.
44. Id. at 383, 285 N.E.2d at 305, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 156 (Breitel, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 385, 285 N.E.2d at 306, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 158 (Breitel, J., dissenting).
46. Id. Judge Breitel characterized what he believed was the essential conflict in-
volved and gave his view as to the proper solution:
The evils of uncontrolled urban sprawl on the one hand, and the suburban and
exurban pressure to exclude urban population on the other hand, have created a
massive conflict, with social and economic implications of the gravest character...
. The conflict has surfaced in other States in efforts by municipalities to cut their
own swaths in solving their difficulties, and, in every instance uncovered, the
courts have struck down the efforts as unconstitutional or as invalid under ena-
bling acts much like those in this state.
Golden, at 385, 285 N.E.2d at 306, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 158 (Breitel, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 383, 285 N.E.2d at 305, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 156 (Breitel, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 385, 285 N.E.2d at 306, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 158 (Breitel, J., dissenting).
49. Berenson, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975).
50. Id. at 110-11, 341 N.E.2d at 242-43, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 680-81.
51. Id.
1992]
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zoning township, but should also consider the effect of the ordi-
nance on the neighboring communities."52 However, if regional
needs were adequately met in neighboring communities, the
town itself need not provide for the region. 3
While Berenson was seemingly aimed only at exclusionary
zoning techniques,54 the principles stated could have far broader
implications. The court took into its own hands the conflict be-
tween state or regional versus local control over land use deci-
sions. The requirement that a statute consider regional needs
was not based on any specific precedent and, in reality, was
found nowhere in state enabling legislation. 5 The problem of re-
gional control identified in Golden,56 while not explicitly ad-
dressed, was partially solved in that case by the court's state-
ment that exclusionary techniques would not be tolerated. 7 The
court took this warning one step further in Berenson,58 by in-
jecting a regional requirement into the determination of a zoning
ordinance's validity.5 9
B. The Recent Cases
The 1980s brought three important land use cases 0 which
marked a shift on the Court of Appeals. In the 1970s the empha-
sis was on regional planning and what the municipalities could
not do. 1 In the 1980s, the emphasis shifted to the ability of mu-
nicipalities to legislate for their own needs, even if directly con-
52. Id. at 111, 341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
53. Id.
54. Berenson, 38 N.Y.2d at 109, 341 N.E.2d at 241, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
55. See generally N.Y. ToWN LAW § 261-84 (McKinney 1987) (zoning and planning
enabling legislation).
56. Golden, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 384 N.Y.S.2d 138.
57. Id. at 378, 285 N.E.2d at 302, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 152.
58. Berenson, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672.
59. Id. at 111, 341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
60. See Kamhi v. Town of Yorktown, 74 N.Y.2d 423, 547 N.E.2d 346, 548 N.Y.S.2d
144 (1989), infra notes 80-111 and accompanying text; Kamhi v. Planning Bd. of York-
town, 59 N.Y.2d 385, 452 N.E.2d 1193, 465 N.Y.S.2d 865 (1983), infra notes 75-79 and
accompanying text; Riegert Apartments Corp. v. Planning Bd. of Clarkstown, 57 N.Y.2d
206, 441 N.E.2d 1076, 455 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1982), infra notes 63-72 and accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378
N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975), supra notes 49-59 and accompanying text; Golden v. Planning Bd.
of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409
U.S. 1003 (1972), supra notes 14-59 and accompanying text.
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flicting with a state statute.2
In 1982, the Court of Appeals decided Riegert Apartments
Corp. v. Planning Bd. of Clarkstown,63 in which a developer
challenged a provision requiring either land, or money in lieu of
land, for park facilities as a prerequisite for site plan approval. 4
In holding the measure invalid," the court differentiated be-
tween permissible regulations on subdivision approval and site
plan approval based on the Town Law provisions.6
The court stated that the town could validly require land, or
money in lieu of land, for developing parks as a prerequisite for
subdivision approval, but that no such measure was permissible
for site plan approval. 7 Otherwise, the court continued, a town
62. See, e.g., Kamhi v. Town of Yorktown, 74 N.Y.2d 423, 547 N.E.2d 346, 548
N.Y.S.2d 144 (1989). See also N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10 (McKinney 1969 & Supp.
1990).
63. 57 N.Y.2d 206, 441 N.E.2d 1076, 455 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1982).
64. Id. at 213, 441 N.E.2d at 1077, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 209-12, 441 N.E.2d at 1078-79, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 559-61. A subdivision is a
division of a lot, tract or parcel of land into two or more lots, tracts or parcels for sale or
development. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1277 (5th ed. 1979). In contrast, a site plan usu-
ally relates to the development of a single lot intended to have one owner. Riegert, 57
N.Y.2d at 211, 441 N.E.2d at 1079, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 560-61. When submitting a site plan,
a builder must show the proposed location on the land of buildings, parking facilities or
other installments. Id.
67. Riegert, 57 N.Y.2d at 208, 441 N.E.2d at 1077, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 559. Town Law
sections 276 and 277 provide the ways in which a town can regulate subdivision plats.
While section 276 delineates the procedural requirements, section 277 allows for substan-
tive measures. N.Y. TOWN LAW §§ 276, 277 (McKinney 1987).
[Sluch plat shall also show.., a park or parks suitably located for playground or
other recreational purposes .... [Tihe board may require as a condition to ap-
proval of any such plat a payment to the town of a sum to be determined by the
town board, which sum shall constitute a trust fund to be used by the town exclu-
sively for neighborhood park, playground or recreation purposes including the ac-
quisition of property.
Id. at § 277(1).
Section 274-a, in contrast, refers to site plans rather than plats and suggests that
certain elements be included in site plan approvals. For example, parking, means of ac-
cess, screening, signs, location and dimension of buildings and impact on adjacent land
uses are all suggested elements of a site plan. Although the above comports with the
general usage of the terms site plan and subdivision plat, section 274-a goes further:
Plats showing lots, blocks or sites which are subject to review pursuant to author-
ity adopted under section two hundred seventy-six of this chapter shall continue
to be subject to such review and shall not be subject to review under this
paragraph.
Id. at § 274-a.
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could burden the development twice, once for subdivision from
the developer and once from individual lot owners seeking ap-
proval for site plans. 8 By placing references to parks in section
277 and omitting these references in section 274-a, the intent, as
the court understood it, was to place the burden of community
concerns on the developer rather than on the individual owner."9
Thus, the court invalidated the town's regulation7 ° because it
was imposed at the wrong phase of the development,71 and, thus,
directly conflicted with the Town Law.72
The Court of Appeals addressed the concern over adequate
parks and recreational facilities twice more in Kamhi v. Plan-
ning Bd. of Yorktown 73 (Kamhi I) and Kamhi v. Town of York-
town 74 (Kamhi II). In Kamhi I, the court considered a provision
requiring conveyance of a percentage of the developer's land for
park purposes as a condition of subdivision approval.75 In addi-
tion to section 277,76 the court considered section 281, which au-
thorizes conditions for changes in plat approval. 7 The court was
unwilling to extend the general provision of section 281(d), 78 re-
lating to park facilities, to allow a town to compel conveyance of
land without cost to itself.79
In Kamhi H11,80 like in Riegert,81 the court considered a town
68. Riegert, 57 N.Y.2d at 212, 441 N.E.2d at 1079, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 561.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 213, 441 N.E.2d at 1077, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 562.
71. Id. at 208, 441 N.E.2d at 1077, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
72. Id. at 212, 441 N.E.2d at 1079, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 561. See also N.Y. ToWN LAW §§
274-a, 276 & 277 (McKinney 1987).
73. 59 N.Y.2d 385, 452 N.E.2d 1193, 465 N.Y.S.2d 865 (1983).
74. 74 N.Y.2d 423, 547 N.E.2d 346, 548 N.Y.S.2d 144 (1989).
75. Kamhi I, 59 N.Y.2d at 388, 452 N.E.2d at 1194, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 866.
76. N.Y. ToWN LAW § 277 (McKinney 1987).
77. Kahmi I, 59 N.Y.2d at 388, 452 N.E.2d at 1194, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 866. See N.Y.
ToWN LAW § 281 (McKinney 1987).
78. Section 281(d) provides that if the plat shows:
lands available for park, recreation, open space, or other municipal purposes di-
rectly related to the plat, then the planning board as a condition of plat approval
may establish such conditions on the ownership, use, and maintenance of such
lands as it deems necessary to assure the preservation of such lands for their in-
tended purposes.
Id. § 281(d).
79. Kamhi I, 59 N.Y.2d at 391, 452 N.E.2d at 1196, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 867. The court
viewed "the power to condition ownership ... as a delegation of power only to limit the
transfer, development or subdivision of park property .... " Id.
80. Kamhi II, 74 N.Y.2d 423, 547 N.E.2d 346, 548 N.Y.S.2d 144.
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requirement of land, or money in lieu of land, as a condition for
site plan approval.2 This time, however, the court engaged in an
informative discussion of the ability of a town to regulate land.8 3
The court initially examined Town Law section 274-a 8' and
found no explicit authority to require land, or money in lieu of
land, for site plan approval.8 5 However, the court went on to ex-
amine the powers of a municipality to regulate under its home
rule powers.8 '
Provisions of the Municipal Home Rule Law8 7 authorize
municipalities to adopt local laws relating to property, affairs or
government, as long as such laws are consistent with the state
constitution and other statutory enactments.8 8 In Kamhi II, be-
cause the town measure was inconsistent with section 274-a,89 no
authority for the measure was found in the Municipal Home
Rule Law provisions relating to the affirmative grants of power.9 0
81. Riegert Apartments Corp. v. Planning Bd. of Clarkstown, 57 N.Y.2d 206, 441
N.E.2d 1076, 455 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1982). See supra notes 63-72 and accompanying text.
82. Kamhi 11, 74 N.Y.2d at 426, 547 N.E.2d at 347, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 145.
83. Id. at 428-33, 547 N.E.2d at 348-49, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 146-49.
84. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 274-a (McKinney 1987).
85. Kamhi 11, 74 N.Y.2d at 428, 547 N.E.2d at 348, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 146. See also
Riegert Apartments Corp. v. Planning Bd. of Clarkstown, 57 N.Y.2d 206, 441 N.E.2d
1076, 455 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1982). See supra notes 63-72 and accompanying text.
86. Kamhi 11, 74 N.Y.2d at 428, 547 N.E.2d at 348, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 146. Municipal
Home Rule Law section 10 gives municipalities general powers to adopt and amend local
laws. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10 (McKinney 1969 & Supp. 1990).
87. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10 (McKinney 1969 & Supp. 1990).
88. Kamhi II, 74 N.Y.2d at 429, 547 N.E.2d at 348, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 146. Municipal
Home Rule Law provides that "every local government shall have power to adopt and
amend local laws not inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution or not inconsis-
tent with any general law relating to its property, affairs or government." N.Y. MUN.
HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(i) (McKinney 1969 & Supp. 1990).
89. Kamhi II, 74 N.Y.2d at 428, 547 N.E.2d at 348, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 146. The court
stated that section 274-a "significantly [did] not authorize a demand of parkland or its
money equivalent." Id.
90. Id. at 429, 547 N.E.2d at 348-49, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 147. Section 10 specifically lists
the areas, whether or not related to property, affairs or government, of permissible mu-
nicipal regulation. These are: (1) Powers, duties, qualifications, number, selection and
removal, term of office, compensation, etc. of officers and employees; (2) membership and
composition of the legislative body; (3) transaction of business; (4) incurring of obliga-
tions; (5) presentation, ascertainment, disposition and discharge of claims against the
government; (6) acquisition, care, management and use of highways, roads, streets, ave-
nues and property; (7) acquisition, ownership and operation of transit facilities; (8) levy
and administration of local taxes (consistent with state law); (9) collection of local taxes
(consistent with state law); (9-a) fixing, levy, collection and administration of local gov-
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However, the supersession authority found in the home rule pro-
visions allows a town to regulate, notwithstanding the fact that
the regulation conflicts with a state law.91 These supersession
provisions allow towns to address their unique concerns even
when these regulations are inconsistent with state-wide enact-
ments.2 The court applied a standard requiring "a sufficient
nexus between the property and the problem being redressed."93
Thus, the town's measure under this standard was appropriate
because, even though it directly conflicted with section 274-a, it
directly promoted the purpose of the state law."'
The court justified a result different from Riegert95 by dis-
tinguishing the actual developments involved.96 Kamhi II, un-
like Riegert,9 7 involved condominium developments which did
not require subdivision approval in Yorktown.9 8 Therefore, if the
ernmental rentals, charges, rates or fees; (10) matters relating to employees of contrac-
tors performing work for the municipality; (11) protection and enhancement of physical
and visual environment; (12) government, protection, order, conduct, safety, health and
well-being of persons or property; (13) apportionment of its legislative body; (14) the
powers granted in statute of local government. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10 (1)(ii)(a)
(McKinney 1969 & Supp. 1990).
Nowhere do these enumerated powers include the authority to compel land or
money in lieu of land as a prerequisite to site'plan approval. Kamhi v. Town of York-
town, 74 N.Y.2d at 429, 547 N.E.2d at 349, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 146-47.
"91. Kamhi 11, 74 N.Y.2d at 429, 547 N.E.2d at 349, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 147. Superses-
sion authority is found in section 10(1)(ii)(d)(3) which provides that:
The amendment or supersession in its application to it, of any provision of
the [town] law relating to the property, affairs or government of the [town] or to
other matters in relation to which . . . it is authorized to adopt local laws by this
section, notwithstanding that such provision is a general law, unless the legislature
expressly shall have prohibited the adoption of such a local law.
N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(ii)(d)(3) (McKinney 1969 & Supp. 1990). This means
that a town can supersede a state law unless the state has expressly prohibited local
regulation in that particular area.
92. Kamhi 11, 74 N.Y.2d at 430, 547 N.E.2d at 349, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 147.
93. Id. at 430-31, 547 N.E.2d at 349, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 147.
94. Id. at 432, 547 N.E.2d at 351, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 149. The court later invalidated
the measure, as applied to this landowner, due to the town's failure to comply with the
specific procedural requirements in the sections. Id. at 435, 547 N.E.2d at 352, 548
N.Y.S.2d at 150.
95. Riegert Apartments Corp. v. Planning Bd. of Clarkstown, 57 N.Y.2d 206, 441
N.E.2d 1076, 455 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1982). See supra notes 63-72 and accompanying text.
96. Kamhi v. Town of Yorktown, 74 N.Y.2d 423, 547 N.E.2d 346, 548 N.Y.S.2d 144
(1989).
97. Riegert, 57 N.Y.2d at 213, 441 N.E.2d at 1077, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
98. Kamhi I, 74 N.Y.2d at 432, 547 N.E.2d at 348, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 148.
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town was to achieve the purpose of section 274-a, namely to ob-
tain parkland for the development, it had to do so in a way that
directly conflicted with other town law provisions prohibiting,
or, at the least, not explicitly authorizing, land or money in lieu
of land, for site plan approval. 9 Because supersession authority
is permissible for areas of uniquely local concern,100 the court
found "that permitting the Town to supersede Town Law [sec-
tion] 274-a in its local application - so that the purpose of the
statute will be promoted rather than defeated within this com-
munity - fits comfortably within section 10. 01
While the majority in Kamhi 11102 construed the home rule
provisions to allow supersession of the Town Law,103 the concur-
rence took exception with this construction.0 According to the
concurrence, the primary issue was whether there was an inde-
pendent legislative delegation of power to regulate in a particu-
lar area.' 5 Without this independent authority, the town had no
power to amend or supersede existing enactments.'0
The concurrence was careful to note that municipalities
have no power to adopt laws inconsistent with any general law of
the state.'0 7 Thus, the provision prohibiting inconsistent local
laws '1 and the provision permitting supersession, provided the
state has not expressly prohibited the measure,'09 are inconsis-
tent."' This inconsistency is reconciled by invalidating local
measures absent a delegation of authority to the town by either
99. Id. at 432, 547 N.E.2d at 348, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 148. The court stated that, when
applied to this particular development, the purpose of section 274-a to burden the devel-
oper rather than the individual owner was wholly circumvented. Id.
100. Id. at 433, 547 N.E.2d at 349, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 149.
101. Id. at 432, 547 N.E.2d at 348-49, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 149.
102. Kamhi v. Town of Yorktown, 74 N.Y.2d 423, 547 N.E.2d 346, 548 N.Y.S.2d 144
(1989).
103. Id.; N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10 (McKinney 1969 & Supp. 1990).
104. Kamhi 11, 74 N.Y.2d at 435, 547 N.E.2d at 353, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 151 (Simons,
J., concurring).
105. Id. at 436, 547 N.E.2d at 353, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 151 (Simons, J., concurring).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(ii)(d)(3) (McKinney 1969 & Supp. 1990).
109. Id.
110. Kamhi H, 74 N.Y.2d at 437, 547 N.E.2d at 354, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 152 (Simons,
J., concurring).
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the state constitution or any other general law."'
The concurrence also examined the legislative history of
home rule provisions and found that the purpose of the provi-
sions was to implement powers already possessed by the town
"by giving them the same authority to supersede or amend gen-
eral laws enjoyed by other local governments."" 2 Therefore, the
real purpose of home rule provisions"' was to provide an effec-
tive means for municipalities to tailor previously delegated
power to suit local conditions' 4 and not, as the majority had
contended, to supplement towns' specifically delegated power." 5
The dichotomy created by the court's earlier cases" 6 and
the most recent cases" 7 leaves this area of the law in a state of
unrest. It is possible that the court, based on its recognition of
the advantages of regional control over land use regulation, be-
came frustrated with the absence of any state advances in this
area. Further, it can be questioned to what extent the decision
in Kamhi II"' allows local governments to supersede state laws.
If the majority decision is interpreted broadly," 9 it can be ar-
gued that local governments now have almost plenary power to
revise state laws to suit their own unique situation. However, the
111. Id.
112. Id. at 438, 547 N.E.2d at 354, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 152 (Simons, J., concurring).
113. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(ii)(d)(3) (McKinney 1969 & Supp. 1990).
114. Kamhi II, 74 N.Y.2d at 439, 547 N.E.2d at 355, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 153 (Simons,
J., concurring). Judge Simons cited several situations where local measures superseding
state law had been upheld. These were: a local measure that transferred certain review
powers to a board other than one authorized to perform the function under Town Law; a
local measure changing certain voting requirements of a town board from a vote of three-
fourths to a simple majority; an amendment of certain filing requirements established in
general laws. Id.
115. Id.
116. See Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378
N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975); Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291,
334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972). See also supra notes 14-59
and accompanying text.
117. See Kamhi v. Town of Yorktown, 74 N.Y.2d 423, 547 N.E.2d 346, 548 N.Y.S.2d
144 (1989); Kamhi v. Planning Bd. of Yorktown, 59 N.Y.2d 385, 452 N.E.2d 1193, 465
N.Y.S.2d 865 (1983); Riegert Apartments Corp. v. Planning Bd. of Clarkstown, 57
N.Y.2d 206, 441 N.E.2d 1076, 455 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1982). See also supra notes 60-115 and
accompanying text.
118. Kamhi v. Town of Yorktown, 74 N.Y.2d 423, 547 N.E.2d 346, 548 N.Y.S.2d 144
(1989). See supra notes 81-115 and accompanying text.
119. Kamhi II, 74 N.Y.2d at 426, 547 N.E.2d at 347, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 145. See supra
notes 80-101 and accompanying text.
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concurrence casts doubt on this interpretation," 0 arguing in-
stead that supersession authority is only as broad as previous
delegations of specific power allow."' At some point, this dichot-
omy must be resolved, either judicially or legislatively.
C. Legal Issues Attendant to Land Regulation
As with any proposed area of governmental regulation, sim-
ply stating a need to legislate and then doing so is not enough.
Not only must the law be constitutional under both the state
and federal constitutions, but it should not conflict with previ-
ously enacted laws. Any law purporting to change a previously
enacted regulatory scheme must be tailored to fit with all the
other existing laws.
1. Constitutional Issues
The United States Constitution protects property and its
ownership.' Consequently, any governmental intrusion upon
this right must fall within these constitutional limitations. While
compliance with these constitutional protections may seem sim-
ple enough, the government may deprive an individual of prop-
erty without due process of law'2 3 or just compensation'24 and
not even know it. This situation is known as confiscation'2 5 or
takings.'2 6
If a government, whether it be state or local, appropriates
land for its own use, it must compensate the owner. 27 Addition-
120. Id. at 435, 547 N.E.2d at 353, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 151 (Simons, J., concurring). See
supra notes 102-15 and accompanying text.
121. Kamhi 11, 74 N.Y.2d at 439, 547 N.E.2d at 355, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 153 (Simons,
J., concurring).
122. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See supra note 1 for the text of this amendment.
123. Id. See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
124. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See supra note 1 for the text of this amendment.
125. "Confiscation" as applied to property issues is the act of taking private prop-
erty "by the government without compensation to the owner." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
271 (5th ed. 1979).
126. "Taking", like confiscation, implies deprivation of property without compensa-
tion. However, taking is a broader concept and can result even when there is not a
change of possession. "Property may be deemed taken ... when there is interference
with the use [and enjoyment] of property.., and it results in a diminution of value ......
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1303 (5th ed. 1979).
127. The power of the government to appropriate property for a public purpose is
19921
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ally, a government may regulate the use of land to such an ex-
tent that it becomes essentially valueless to the owner, resulting
in a form of taking. 128 The New York Court of Appeals has said
that a zoning ordinance is confiscatory and, therefore, unconsti-
tutional if it prevents a landowner from using his property for
any purpose for which it is reasonably adapted. 12 9
Generally, the court will uphold a regulation if it is reasona-
bly related to a legitimate governmental interest. 30 In addition,
the landowner has a tremendous burden to prove that the land
cannot be developed so as to yield a reasonable return.' 3' In
some cases, the court has refused to find an application of the
regulation unconstitutional where the land could not return as
high a profit as it would have absent the regulation.'32 Conse-
quently, the task of challenging a regulation on the basis of con-
fiscation or taking is rather difficult for the land owner where
the only damage has been a diminution in the value of the land.
2. Statutory Issues in New York
In New York there are certain statutory barriers to any po-
tential challenge to a local land use regulation. The state ena-
bling legislation has given municipalities a great deal of author-
-ity to regulate the use of land within its boundaries. 33 Even if
the local measure conflicts with other state enactments, it may
still be valid under supersession authority.'34
Under state enabling legislation, a municipality has broad
authority to regulate land use decisions.' The limitations on
called "eminent domain." An exercise of this power requires the owner to receive just
compensation for his property. The right of eminent domain is the right of the state to
reassert its dominion over any portion of the soil of the state for public good. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 470 (5th ed. 1979).
128. See CUNNINGHAM ET. AL., supra note 7, § 9.2 at 517.
129. Williams v. Town of Oyster Bay, 32 N.Y.2d 78, 81, 295 N.E.2d 788, 790, 343
N.Y.S.2d 118, 122 (1973).
130. But see, Town of Islip v. Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d 544, 540 N.E.2d 215, 542 N.Y.S.2d
139 (1989). The court here used a heightened level of scrutiny because First Amendment
issues were involved. Id. at 552, 540 N.E.2d at 218, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 142.
131. See Rice, supra note 2, at 641, 652-54.
132. See Williams v. Town of Oyster Bay, 32 N.Y.2d 78, 81, 295 N.E.2d 788,790, 343
N.Y.S.2d 118, 122 (1973).
133. See generally N.Y. TOWN LAW §§ 261-84 (McKinney 1987).
134. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(ii)(d)(3) (McKinney 1969 & Supp. 1990).
135. See generally N.Y. ToWN LAW §§ 261-84 (McKinney 1987).
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this power are few. Town Law section 261 appears to limit a
town's regulatory power to certain physical concerns, such as a
building's height, the percentage of a lot that may be occupied
and the population density. However, these powers are ex-
panded by the policies for which the town can regulate, namely,
to promote the health, safety, morals or general welfare of the
community. 136
In addition, while section 263 enumerates the proper pur-
poses for such regulations, these purposes are described with
very general terms. "Such regulations shall be made with reason-
able consideration, among other things, as to the character of
the district and its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and
with a view to conserving the value of buildings and encouraging
the most appropriate use of land throughout such municipal-
ity. 1 37 This demonstrates the policies for which municipalities
may regulate. Other sections also grant fairly general powers,
some limited by specific enumerations.'38
In general, the Court of Appeals has liberally construed
these statutes, invalidating local regulations only when clearly
outside the scope of permissible regulations 139 or enacted with a
clearly exclusionary purpose. 4 ' In other cases, the court has up-
held the validity of regulatory measures even when clearly con-
flicting with state statutes under municipal home rule
authority.""
While municipalities have broad authority to regulate under
state enabling legislation, this authority may be further ex-
panded by municipal home rule provisions. 4" Municipal Home
Rule Law provisions enable municipalities to adopt local laws
and to amend or supersede the application of state laws. 43 Be-
136. Id. § 261.
137. Id. § 263.
138. See, e.g., id. §§ 276, 277 & 281.
139. See, e.g., Kamhi v. Planning Bd. of Yorktown, 59 N.Y.2d 385, 452 N.E.2d 1193,
465 N.Y.2d 865 (1983). See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378
N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975). See supra notes 49-59 and accompanying text.
141. See Kamhi v. Town of Yorktown, 74 N.Y.2d 423, 547 N.E.2d 346, 548 N.Y.S.2d
144 (1989). See supra notes 80-115 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 87-115 and accompanying text for a discussion of Municipal
Home Rule Law.
143. Rice, supra note 2, at 641. For example, Town Law or Village Law can be
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cause of these provisions, municipalities can create "numerous
imaginative local enactments which [seek] to tailor zoning laws
to the particular needs of a locality and to avoid restrictive pro-
visions of the enabling legislation."1"
This supersession authority was upheld by the court in
Kamhi v. Town of Yorktown.14 5 In Kamhi II, the court, while
referring to the supersession authority as a limited exception,4 6
found that "the Legislature has recognized that situations may
arise where laws of state-wide application are appropriately tai-
lored by municipalities to fit their own peculiarly local needs."' 4
Thus, a municipality has almost plenary power to create its own
measures for land use regulation. The only limitation under mu-
nicipal home rule provisions, as construed by the Kamhi II ma-
jority, is when a state has expressly prohibited a local law 48 or
when a local law is otherwise preempted by state law.'4 9 In
reaching its conclusion that the local measure, at least substan-
tively, was within the authority granted by the state, 50 the court
took heed of the legislature's directive that Municipal Home
Rule Law should be liberally construed.' 5 1 Although the concur-
rence agreed with the result, it specifically disagreed with the
majority's construction of home rule authority. 5 '
While Kamhi II upheld substantive provisions of a local
amended or superseded.
144. Id. at 641-642.
145. 74 N.Y.2d 423, 547 N.E.2d 346, 548 N.Y.S.2d 144 (1981). See supra notes 80-
115 and accompanying text.
146. Id. at 429, 547 N.E.2d at 349, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 147.
147. Id. at 430, 547 N.E.2d at 349, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 147.
148. Id. See also N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(ii)(d)(3) (McKinney 1969 &
Supp. 1990).
149. Kamhi 11, 74 N.Y.2d at 430, 547 N.E.2d at 349, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 147 (quoting
Albany Area Bldrs. Assn. v. Town of Guilderland, 74 N.Y.2d 372, 546 N.E.2d 920, 547
N.Y.S.2d 627 (1989)).
150. Kamhi II, 74 N.Y.2d at 432, 547 N.E.2d at 350-51, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 149. The
court later invalidated the measure as applied to this landowner for the town's failure to
comply with the procedural requirements of Municipal Home Rule Law. Id. at 435, 547
N.E.2d at 352, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 150. See also N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 22(1) (Mc-
Kinney 1969 & Supp. 1990).
151. Kamhi 11, 74 N.Y.2d at 428, 547 N.E.2d at 348, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 146. See also
N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 51 (McKinney 1969 & Supp. 1990).
152. Kamhi II, 74 N.Y.2d at 435-36, 547 N.E.2d at 353, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 151
(Simons, J., concurring).
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regulation based on home rule provisions," 3 the concurrence and
other commentators have cast doubt on the validity and scope of
this construction.5" The dichotomy created by these two views
of home rule leaves the current state of the law uncertain.
D. Types of State-Wide Land Use Schemes
Other states, unlike New York, have state-wide land use
regulations. These regulations, in many cases, require - rather
than allow - a comprehensive plan. 155 What follows is a gen-
eral survey of several types of state-wide land use regulations
and the states that have implemented them.
1. The Concurrency Statute
The basic purpose of a concurrency statute is to synchronize
development with the availability of essential governmental ser-
vices. In this way, the ability of governments to support develop-
ments is not unnecessarily burdened. The government also has
the ability to plan for the future by allocating resources to pro-
posed developments. This type of scheme was used by Ramapo,
giving the town the ability to prevent chaotic development and
urban sprawl.56 Like Ramapo, Florida determined a need' for
this type of regulation on a state-wide basis.'57
In the early 1980s, Florida enacted voluminous land use reg-
ulations to guide its municipalities when making these decisions.
In the "Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land
Development Regulation Act,' 58 Florida's stated policy objec-
tive was "to utilize and strengthen the existing role, processes,
and powers of local governments in the establishment and im-
plementation of comprehensive planning programs to guide and
153. Id. at 432, 547 N.E.2d at 351, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 149.
154. See Kamhi 11, 74 N.Y.2d at 435, 547 N.E.2d at 353, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 151
(Simons, J., concurring). See also James D. Cole, Constitutional Home Rule in New
York: "The Ghost of Home Rule", 59 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 713 (1985).
155. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 163.3161-163.3194 (West 1990); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 30-A, §§ 4301-4344 (West Supp. 1990); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 197.175-197.283
(1989).
156. See supra notes 14-29 and accompanying text.
157. See generally FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 163.3161-163.3194 (West 1990).
158. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3161(1) (West 1990).
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control future development. '" 159
To this end, Florida requires each local government to pre-
pare a comprehensive plan'60 containing certain elements.' 6' The
required elements include: a capital improvements element
designed to encourage the efficient use of government facili-
ties;" 2 a future land use plan element;"6 3 a traffic circulation ele-
ment;"' a conservation element; 6 5 and a housing element. 6
The plan also requires coordination with adjacent municipali-
ties, including a policy statement indicating the relationship be-
tween a proposed development and the comprehensive plan of
an adjacent municipality.6 7
In addition to the required elements, the comprehensive
plan may contain a public buildings and related facilities ele-
ment, a recommended community design element, an historic
and scenic preservation element or an economic element. 6 8 An
important provision in Florida's regulation is section 167.3167(3)
which provides that where a local government is required to pre-
pare a comprehensive plan and does not do so, the regional
agency created by the statute will prepare one for the locality.6 9
The plan created by the regional agency will have the same sta-
tus under the law as would the plan created by the
municipality. 70
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Florida's statute is
what is termed the "concurrency" requirement.' 7 ' Section
159. Id. § 163.3161(2).
160. Id. § 163.3167(2).
161. Id. § 163.3177.
162. Id. § 163.3177(3)(a). It should be noted that this scheme is very similar to that
used by Ramapo in Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291,
334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972). See supra notes 14-29 and
accompanying text.
163. Id. § 163.3177(6)(a).
164. Id. § 163.3177(6)(b).
165. Id. § 163.3177(6)(d).
166. Id. § 163.3177(6)(f).
167. Id. § 163.3177(4)(a).
168. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3177(7) (West 1990). Other optional elements include a
general area redevelopment element, a safety element and other elements that may be
peculiar to the locality. Id.
169. Id. § 163.3167(3).
170. Id.
171. Lawrence A. Levy, Living with Growth Management - Florida in the 1990s,
1990 URB., ST. AND Loc. L. NEWSL. 13 at 1.
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163.3177(10)(h) states:
It is the intent of the legislature that public facilities and services
needed to support development shall be available concurrent with
the impacts of such development .... [Plublic facility and service
availability shall be deemed sufficient if the public facilities and
services for a development are phased ... so that the public facil-
ities and those related services which are deemed necessary by
the local government to operate the facilities necessitated by that
development are available concurrent with the impacts of the
development. 7 '
This requirement of availability of governmental services is very
similar to the local measure upheld by the court in Golden v.
Planning Bd. of Ramapo.1 "
2. The Mandatory Guideline Statute
The mandatory guideline statute puts the responsibility of
goals and guidelines on the state while giving primary responsi-
bility of implementation and regulation to smaller governmental
entities. This type of statute encourages the involvement of the
government and the citizenry in enacting these guidelines. All
local land use regulations must comply with the guidelines to
create uniform development throughout the state. Oregon has
enacted this type of statute in an attempt to manage its growth
on a state-wide scale.174
Oregon's stated purpose in enacting a comprehensive land
use statute was that "[u]ncoordinated use of lands within [the]
state threaten the orderly development, the environment of this
state and the health, safety, order, convenience, prosperity and
welfare of the people of [Oregon]. '7 5 Oregon requires compre-
hensive plans from each city and county and requires them to
exercise their zoning and planning responsibilities. 17 6
In addition to the above requirement, Oregon provides for
the adoption of policy goals relating to wetland areas, wilder-
172. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3177(10)(h) (West 1990).
173. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S.
1003 (1972). See supra notes 14-48 and accompanying text.
174. See generally OR. REV. STAT. §§ 197.174-197.283 (1989).
175. OR. REV. STAT. § 197.005 (1989).
176. Id. § 197.175(1), (2)(a).
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ness, recreational and outstanding scenic areas, unique wildlife
habitats and agricultural land.1  Further, all locally enacted
comprehensive plans and land use regulations must be in com-
pliance with the enacted goals.178 Oregon also provides for the
designation of critical concern areas for which regulations are
more strictly enforced. 17
The unique features of this land use regulation scheme in-
clude the forced participation of local governments and the ab-
sence of state regulation regarding the comprehensive plans.18 0
While state government or agencies provide guidance by enact-
ing standards to which the plans must comply, the actual regula-
tion is still left to the local governments.' Thus, the power is
decentralized. Another unique feature of this scheme is the re-
quirement that governments allow citizen involvement when reg-
ulating land uses.18 2
Oregon's scheme has several advantages. First, the land
management system has helped to protect a large amount of
farm land that otherwise would have been lost.8 3 Second, the
scheme has created a flood of public support.'8" Third, the struc-
ture of the program has ensured compliance with statewide
goals.' Fourth, the plan has required all jurisdictions to estab-
lish boundaries beyond which development cannot go, establish-
ing a more contiguous pattern of growth. 86
177. Id. § 197.230.
178. Id. § 197.250. The goals that have been enacted include: citizen involvement,
land-use planning, agricultural land, forest lands, areas subject to natural disasters and
hazards, recreational needs, economy, housing, public facilities, transportation, energy
conservation, urbanization and ocean resources. See YARO & REID, supra note 2, at 26-
27.
179. OR. REV. STAT. § 197.405, 410 (1989).
180. YARO & REID, supra note 2, at 25.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 26.
183. Id. at 28.
184. Id.
185. YARO & REID, supra note 2, at 28.
186. Id.
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3. The Policy Statute
While similar to the mandatory guideline statute, 87 the pol-
icy statute is different in that it attempts to coordinate planning
among all governmental units, rather then mandating the type
of regulation required. In this type of scheme, the state enacts
policies and guidelines to be considered by regional and county
entities when creating plans for development. This type of stat-
ute places the greatest emphasis on smaller governmental units
and requires state consideration of these local plans. Hawaii has
enacted this type of statute. 88
Hawaii created a state-wide planning scheme because it
found a need to "improve the planning process . . ., to increase
the effectiveness of public and private actions, to improve coor-
dination among different agencies and levels of government, to
provide for wise use of Hawaii's resources and to guide the fu-
ture development of the State." '89 One significant aspect of Ha-
waii's plan is an identification and enumeration of goals and pol-
icies of the state and its people. 90 Not only are goals relating to
the economy, the physical environment, and the well-being of
citizens and the state identified, 9 ' but also, objectives and poli-
cies relating to the population,' 92 the general economy,'93 the ag-
ricultural economy,'9 4 the tourism industry, 9 5 the physical envi-
ronment,'9 6 housing issues,' 9 and socio-cultural advancement in
health'98 and education.'99
These identified policies are implemented through several
mechanisms. First, the state plan provides for the creation of
state functional plans which comply with all identified policies
187. See supra notes 174-86 and accompanying text.
188. See generally HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 226-1-226-105 (1985).
189. Id. § 226-1.
190. Id.
191. Id. § 226-4.
192. Id. § 226-5.
193. Id. § 226-6.
194. Id. § 226-7.
195. Id. § 226-8.
196. Id. § 226-11, 13.
197. Id. § 226-19.
198. Id. § 226-20.
199. Id. § 226-21.
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and priorities. 00 Next, the state functional plan requires" '
county general development plans indicating desired population
and physical development patterns for the area. °20 County plans
are also required to address problems and needs unique to that
particular area.203 The policies are implemented through several
councils, including the policy council, 04 and the department of
planning and economic development. 0 5
In requiring a state functional plan, Hawaii explicitly re-
quires local input. The plan is to be prepared by a state agency
head responsible for the area who must "work in close coopera-
tion with the advisory committee, respective officials, and people
of each county. In the formulation of the functional plan, the
preparing agency shall solicit public views and concerns."2 6 The
plan must also take the county general plan into
consideration.20 7
There are several unique features of Hawaii's approach to
state-wide planning. By legislating policies, objectives and pri-
orities, the state allows smaller governmental units greater lati-
tude in determining the means to achieve these ends. They must
take into account the state-wide concerns, but unique local con-
cerns are not ignored. In addition, the state not only permits,
but requires, consideration of concerns of the local populous.
This enables every interested citizen to become involved and to
have a say in the future direction of the state.
4. The Inventory and Analysis Statute
The inventory and analysis statute, while similar in goals
and policies to other types of schemes,20 is unique in what it
requires from local governments. The state enacts goals and
guidelines to be followed by the localities in creating their com-
200. Id. § 226-52(a)(2)-(3).
201. Id. § 226-52(a)(3).
202. Id. § 226-52(a)(4).
203. Id.
204. Id. § 226-52(b)(1).
205. Id. § 226-55.
206. Id. § 226-57.
207. Id.
208. For a discussion of the other state mandatory plans, see supra notes 156-207
and accompanying text.
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prehensive plans and implementation procedures, and requires
an inventory and analysis section to be included in the compre-
hensive plan. This inventory and analysis requirement provides
the greatest amount of future planning by an evaluation of the
current situation. Maine has enacted this type of statute. '
Maine's purpose in enacting its state-wide growth manage-
ment scheme, was to "[p]rovide municipalities with the tools
and resources to effectively plan for and manage future develop-
ment .. .with a maximum of local initiative and flexibility. '210
Maine also established a set of goals to "provide overall direc-
tion and consistency to the planning"211 of all local entities "in
order to promote the general health, safety and welfare of [its]
citizens. '" 2
12
In order to accomplish its purposes, Maine provides that
every municipality must plan for its future growth and develop-
ment by adopting growth management programs, including a
comprehensive plan and the methods of its implementation.2 1 3
The state further requires that every municipality create a local
planning committee to implement the required growth manage-
ment plan.2 ' Local government must first encourage citizen in-
volvement by "soliciting and considering a broad range of public
review and comment"21 before it can create or implement any
comprehensive plan.216
Maine requires every municipality to enact a comprehensive
plan,' 17 with various required elements. These elements include
inventory and analysis, 218 policy development,1 9 an implementa-
209. See generally ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, §§ 4301-4344 (West Supp. 1990).
210. Id. § 4312(2)(B).
211. Id. § 4312(3).
212. Id.
213. Id. § 4323.
214. Id. § 4324(1)-(2).
215. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 4324(3) (West Supp. 1990).
216. Id.
217. Id. § 4323(2).
218. Id. § 4326(1). This element includes economic and demographic data, signifi-
cant water resources, significant or critical natural resources, existing recreational areas,
existing transportation systems and an assessment of capital facilities and public services
necessary to support growth.
219. Id. § 4326(2). Policy development is intended to promote state goals and ad-
dress conflict between regional and local issues.
19921
25
PACE LAW REVIEW
221tion strategy,220 and a regional coordination program.
Although Maine requires a great deal of local implementa-
tion, it provides assistance in the form of a review agency to pro-
vide not only the promotion of local programs, but also technical
and financial assistance.2 2 2 In addition, all localities must submit
their plans to state authorities for review for consistency with
the established goals and guidelines.2
2
This scheme has features similar to those of other states.2 24
However, Maine appears to be the most stringent in its require-
ments. Although providing a large amount of aid to municipali-
ties, Maine expects the localities to take a large amount of re-
sponsibility for the planning process, including the planning
mechanisms and implementation systems. Maine also retains the
power of review over the local plans to determine compliance
with state guidelines. Although its provisions are stringent, by
enacting the goals and guidelines, rather than the actual regula-
tion, Maine allows its localities a great deal of creative freedom
in determining the best method of implementation for the area.
In addition, the requirement of citizen involvement ensures in-
put from all levels of government and the general population.
III. Analysis
While some commentators have suggested and some states
have even implemented state-wide land use regulations,22 5
wholesale applicability of these schemes to New York would be
ill advised. Obviously, any general reform would have to be tai-
220. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 4326(3) (West Supp. 1990). The implementa-
tion strategy must contain a timetable for the implementation program, to identify
growth and rural areas, and develop a capital investment plan for financing public
facilities.
221. Id. § 4326(4).
222. Id. § 4341. See also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 4344 (West Supp. 1990).
223. Id. § 4343.
224. For example, like Florida, supra notes 156-73 and accompanying text, and Ore-
gon, supra notes 174-86 and accompanying text, Maine requires a comprehensive plan
with cdrtain mandatory elements. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 4326(3) (West Supp.
1990).
225. See, e.g., infra notes 228-41 and accompanying text; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
163.3161-163.3194 (West 1990), supra notes 156-73 and accompanying text; ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, §§ 4301-4344 (West Supp. 1990), supra notes 208-24 and accompa-
nying text; OR. REV. STAT. §§ 197.175-197.283 (1989), supra notes 174-86 and accompany-
ing text.
[Vol. 12:107
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol12/iss1/3
GOLDEN REVISITED
lored specifically to fit with New York's own governmental sys-
tems and current enabling legislation.26 In addition, because
other states enact their own land use schemes with their own
particular problems and situations in mind, any wholesale adop-
tion would not be sufficient to deal with either the problems fac-
ing New York, or the balance of power between the state and
local governments. Therefore, the best possible solution is to tai-
lor a unique scheme to fit New York by adopting selectively
from other sources.
A. General Reforms
A number of reforms have been suggested that are designed
to accomplish the shift from purely local control of land use de-
cisions to greater state intervention and control. 227 These sug-
gested reforms may be reasonable for New York, given the
strong local power over land use decisions and the current doubt
as to the viability of municipal home rule. 28
The first proposed reform concerns the nature of local plan-
ning and regulation. Rather than being reactionary, local plan-
ning must be more affirmative in its approach.2 Most local
planning decisions are the result of emotional reactions to a pro-
posed development. However, these decisions should be the re-
sult of a more positive exercise of power.2 30 This would include
using a local plan to provide guidance when making decisions
and to facilitate negotiations between local governments and pri-
vate developers. 31 This could work in New York if the state
were to require some kind of comprehensive, long-term plan
from each locality. The plan would not necessarily be used by
the state, but used by the locality to make decisions based on its
documented long-range plans.
The second proposed reform encourages the states to as-
sume more responsibility for controlling the regional impact of
local development. 32 While regional impact is almost certain to
226. See supra notes 14-115 and accompanying text.
227. Solomon, supra note 3.
228. See supra notes 87-115, 142-54 and accompanying text.
229. Solomon, supra note 3, at 278.
230. Id. at 278-79.
231. Id. at 279.
232. Id.
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occur, any regional control is largely impotent in its ability to
minimize this impact. Regional mechanisms generally have the
responsibility but lack the authority possessed by the sovereign
state.2 31 In New York, giving affirmative power to regional gov-
ernmental units may be a viable option. Because of the vastly
different regions within the state, some regional control is possi-
ble as long as there are compatible interests within the region.
For example, a region which contains both heavily populated ur-
ban areas and low density rural areas may not be effective given
the competing interests within the region. However, any regional
control mechanism must have authority from the state to carry
out its function. Perhaps creating an intermediate level of gov-
ernment for land use decisions is not preferable for New York.
This would just involve more bureaucratic red tape and proba-
bly would not accomplish anything.
The third reform suggested is a reduction in a locality's in-
centive to utilize exclusionary tactics such as maintenance of the
status quo.234 This is accomplished through greater state as-
sumption of financial responsibility for the drain on local re-
sources attendant to increased development. 35 Given the situa-
tion seen in Ramapo this reform is reasonable and possibly
viable.23 ' If a municipality has a scheme to slow or even stop
development because of the lack of resources to support the de-
velopment, state assumption of some financial responsibility
would not only allow the development, but may encourage mu-
nicipalities to actually increase development to receive more
funds. This could create great incentives for municipalities to
construct affordable housing units, and abstain from exclusion-
ary tactics.
The fourth reform suggests that the public have a more pos-
itive role in land development.237 This can be accomplished
through public land holding designed to acquire available land
and to sell it to private developers for uses consistent with a
comprehensive plan. Public land holding can also preserve unde-
233. Id.
234. Solomon, supra note 3, at 280.
235. Id.
236. See supra notes 14-29 and accompanying text.
237. Solomon, supra note 3, at 280.
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veloped land or promote a development project deemed to be in
the public interest.2 38 However, the applicability of this reform
to New York may be problematic, because while theoretically
possible, there is a great potential for abuse. For example, this
technique could easily be abused by localities that wish to hin-
der development and maintain the status quo. Further, it is also
problematic in terms of the availability of funds with which to
purchase the land. Obviously, the local government could not
just take the land, and may lack the funds to purchase a suffi-
cient amount of land to make the scheme work.
The fifth proposed reform is that the courts not only en-
force the above reforms and controls, but also relax current legal
standards. 39 While the courts are important to any reform in
land use regulation, it seems that in New York, the courts have
already identified a problem for which there is no legislative so-
lution. In New York, the reform should come from the legisla-
ture. Of course, the courts are an important aspect in making
the scheme work, but the legislature must be the starting point.
These proposed reforms, taken together with other state
models, can provide a workable solution for New York. Because
the states discussed above have tailored state-wide schemes to
their unique characteristics and needs, 40 the wholesale adoption
of any of them would not provide the proper solution for New
York. It may be preferable for New York to pick and choose
specific components to tailor its own state-wide scheme.
B. Other States' Schenies
Some aspects of Florida's land use model can be used in
New York. For example, the concept of concurrency2 41 could be
fairly applicable due to the mix of rural and urban areas, al-
lowing for development to progress at a rate commensurate with
the government's ability to support that development. This
would allow highly developed areas to avoid further develop-
238. Id.
239. Id. at 280-81. One standard that could be relaxed is the "dimunition in prop-
erty value test" to determine whether a private land owner must bear a restriction on the
use of land without compensation from the government. Id. See also supra notes 127-132
and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 155-224 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 157-72 and accompanying text.
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ment and other less developed areas to develop at their own
rate. A problem with the concurrency scheme for New York is
the municipalities' ability to use the scheme to avoid continued
development. As was seen with Ramapo, the municipality could
conceivably slow or even stop development for a number of
years while claiming inability to support developments with ser-
vices.2 42 If the state were to assume a greater financial responsi-
bility for the drain increased development places on localities,
then municipalities would no longer be able to claim a drain on
governmental resources.
One aspect of Oregon's mode 2 43 that would be suitable for
New York's home rule tradition 244 is the ability of local govern-
ments to make substantive decisions as long as they are in com-
pliance with state policy objectives. Having once given the local
governments the strong power to regulate, taking it away would
not be well received. The strong citizen support exhibited in Or-
egon is not likely to be seen in New York where local control
over land use decisions is subject to greater influence by citizen
landowners in the municipality.
Hawaii's scheme 246 has certain desirable characteristics with
respect to strong citizen involvement. Although strong citizen in-
volvement may not be seen in New York with regard to a state
land use regulation, state policy objectives may be better re-
ceived. In addition, Hawaii requires citizen input from each af-
fected locality. 246 This is an attractive solution for localities in
New York, where local citizens can have a say in the future law
of the state. The policies and priorities of Hawaii have another
attractive characteristic. By enacting a similar scheme New York
would give greater power to the localities while still requiring
some continuity among them. Through this, local government is
satisfied because the actual decision about the use of land is still
made at the local level. Additionally, the state is satisfied be-
cause the local decisions follow policy guidelines thereby creat-
ing some regularity in the state.
242. See supra notes 14-29 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 174-86 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 87-115, 133-54 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 188-207 and accompanying text.
246. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
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It may be that Maine's provisions"17 require too much from
local governments to be effective in New York. Further, because
of the strong home rule tradition in New York,2"" plenary state
review of local comprehensive plans would not likely find favor
with either local governments or their citizens. If modified,
Maine's requirement of a comprehensive plan and implementa-
tion strategies 4 9 may work in New York. This would give local
governments the maximum input into the future of the area. In
addition, through the inventory and analysis component of the
comprehensive plan, local governments would be forced to eval-
uate the current situation and create a plan for future growth.
This would at least create some awareness, at the local level, of
the deficiencies in development in the area.
Considering all the possible reforms New York could use,
the best possible solution is one that would maximize local input
and decision-making, while requiring some continuity among de-
cisions. To this end, New York should codify policy guidelines
and goals to be considered by every local government in creating
a mandatory comprehensive plan. Of course, included in this
plan would be an analysis of every locality's current situation.
The power of review by the state should extend only to the point
of ensuring compliance with the state-wide policies and goals.
Actual implementation should be left purely to the local govern-
ments. Any conflict arising from a challenged application of local
implementation would be resolved by the courts which would
determine whether the local enforcement falls within state goals.
This specifically tailored scheme would generally maintain the
current balance of power between the state and local govern-
ments, but would allow for uniform decision-making throughout
the state.
IV. Conclusion
Any drastic change in the law is difficult. In New York, it
may be time to examine the current distribution of power and
make some changes. The New York Court of Appeals identified
a problem almost twenty years ago, yet there has been no legis-
247. See supra notes 211-23 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 87-115, 133-54 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 208-24 and accompanying text.
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lative change. In an era of environmental and housing concerns,
it is time to redistribute power to accomplish changes for the
public good. New York should heed the words of the Court of
Appeals from ,1972250 and realize that state control can indeed
serve greater interests than purely local decisions.
Jill Devine*
250. See supra notes 39-48 and accompanying text.
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